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Abstract—Implementation of cryptographic primitives like
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and True Random Num-
ber Generators (TRNGs) depends significantly on the underlying
hardware. Common evaluation boards offered by FPGA vendors
are not suitable for a fair benchmarking, since they have different
vendor dependent configuration and contain noisy switching
power supplies. The proposed hardware platform is primary
aimed at testing and evaluation of cryptographic primitives
across different FPGA and ASIC families. The modular platform
consists of a motherboard and exchangeable daughter board
modules. These are designed to be as simple as possible to
allow cheap and independent evaluation of cryptographic blocks
and namely PUFs. The motherboard is based on the Microsemi
SmartFusion 2 SoC FPGA. It features a low-noise power supply,
which simplifies evaluation of vulnerability to the side channel
attacks. It provides also means of communication between the
PC and the daughter module. Available software tools can be
easily customized, for example to collect data from the random
number generator located in the daughter module and to read it
via USB interface. The daughter module can be plugged into
the motherboard or connected using an HDMI cable to be
placed inside a Faraday cage or a temperature control chamber.
The whole platform was designed and optimized to fullfil the
European HECTOR project (H2020) requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, we live in an information society where infor-
mation appears mostly in a digital form. An electronic mail is
used more often than a traditional mail, documents are stored
in a digital form more than on a paper and information is
often very expensive. Cryptography has become increasingly
important to ensure data security.
In the framework of the information security politics of
the European Union, a project called HECTOR [1] was
recently accepted for funding. The project emerged from the
scientific cooperation of TRUDEVICE partners: KU Leu-
ven and Jean Monnet University Saint-Etienne. HECTOR
should bridge basic algorithmic approaches with hardware-
level security implementations. It requires to evaluate in a fair
way many hardware dependent cryptographic primitives, in
many different technologies. A flexible platform for testing
and evaluation of primitives implemented on various Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and Application-Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) devices was therefore needed.
II. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND RANDOMNESS
Cryptography applies mathematical methods to ensure in-
formation security requirements such as data confidentiality,
integrity, and authentication, but also authentication of devices
and subjects [2]. It uses cryptographic primitives to build
cryptographic protocols. Cryptographic primitives like random
number generators (RNGs) and physical unclonable functions
(PUFs) extract randomness from the underlying hardware.
Although other cryptographic primitives like symmetric- or
asymmetric-key ciphers, and one way functions are determin-
istic, their implementation in hardware can leak confidential
information and it is therefore hardware dependent, too.
A. Random Number Generators
Random numbers play an important role in information
security applications. They are used as confidential keys,
initialization vectors, nonces in authentication protocols, and
masks in side-channel attack countermeasures.
RNGs generate sequences of random numbers (bits or
vectors of bits), which have to fulfill two fundamental re-
quirements: statistical quality and unpredictability. The un-
predictability of generated numbers can be based on a com-
putational hardness or on some exploitation of a random
physical process. In the first group of generators called the
deterministic RNGs, it must be computationally difficult to
guess the following or preceding output values of the generator
from the current output value. In the second group of RNGs
called true RNGs (TRNGs) the unpredictability comes from an
unpredictable and non manipulable random physical process
like thermal noise. Although better from the point of view of
unpredictability, TRNGs are usually slower and have lower
statistical quality than their deterministic competitor.
B. Physically Unclonable Functions
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [5] are pieces of
hardware exploiting randomness in the device manufacturing
process. They are based on physical characteristics which are
reliable and unique for each chip, difficult to predict, and easy
to evaluate. PUF cannot be replicated, even if the full design
is known [6]. PUFs can be used to authenticate hardware or
to generate hardware dependent confidential keys.
C. Hardware Dependence of TRNGs and PUFs
Both TRNGs and PUFs depend significantly on the un-
derlying hardware. TRNGs use dynamic random process like
electric noises to generate random numbers. PUFs use random
phenomena appearing during the manufacturing process of
logic devices. Both TRNGs and PUFs are influenced by
surrounding hardware, which must be designed very carefully.
D. HECTOR Project
HECTOR (Hardware Enabled Crypto and Randomness) is
a European cooperative research project. The main objective
of this project is to close the gap between basic algorithmic
approaches and hardware-level security implementations [1].
The main goal of the project is to study, design and implement
RNGs and PUFs with demonstrable entropy guarantees and
quality metrics. This includes on-the-fly entropy estimation
and evaluation of robustness against physical attacks, which
is needed in the security evaluation and certification process.
III. PLATFORMS DEDICATED TO EVALUATION OF
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
The hardware dedicated to evaluation of cryptographic
primitives must fulfill special requirements, especially from
the point of view of electric noises, electro-magnetic inter-
ference and robustness of the design. Several solutions are
currently available.
The Research Center for Information Security (RCIS) of
AIST and Tohoku University developed the Side-channel At-
tack Standard Evaluation BOard (SASEBO) [7] as a research
project funded by METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry, Japan). Several SASEBO boards aimed at evaluation
of cryptographic functions implemented in FPGAs, ASICs,
and Smartcards are available. The boards were designed essen-
tially as platforms for evaluation of SCA attacks. They contain
mostly two FPGAs: one as a target of evaluation (ToE), and the
second one controls the target. Unfortunately, the ToE cannot
be separated from the control FPGA and cannot be placed
remotely in a hostile environment (a temperature controlled
chamber or a chamber with a strong electro-magnetic field).
The second disadvantage of the SASEBO boards in the context
of the HECTOR project is, that only a limited choice of FPGA
devices is available. This argument is valid also for SAKURA
boards, which are successors of the SASEBO boards. Last but
not least, the SASEBO (and SAKURA) boards are complex
and thus expensive and consequently, not suitable for evalua-
tion of PUFs, where a large amount of devices must be tested.
Another platform, a Flexible Open-source BOard for Side-
channel analysis (FOBOS) [8] was designed by the George
Mason University for conducting side-channel attacks on
FPGAs. The platform consists of two different boards, one
is used as a control board and another one as a device under
test (DUT). Both cards are connected together by a module,
which is called a bridge connector. The advantage of this
platform is that it use a commercially available boards – it
is therefore cheaper. But the use of commercially available
general purpose evaluation boards is also the main disadvan-
tage of this solution: these boards were not intended for SCA
evaluation purposes, they contain many redundant components
and switching power supplies generating significant electronic
noise.
Evariste III [9], is a platform aimed at development and
evaluation of cryptographic functions and primitives in re-
configurable hardware. The platform was developed by the
Jean Monnet University in cooperation with the MICRONIC
company. It is a modular platform containing daughter boards
(featuring target FPGAs or ASICs) and a motherboard contain-
ing USB data interface device. Three daughter boards designed
for Evariste III and several other daughter boards designed
for older platform Evariste II are availaboe. The Evariste III
modules contain connectors for SCA measurements. The main
disadvantage of the Evariste III (and the Evariste II) system
is that the modules cannot be used remotely, and that they are
relatively expensive since they contain power supplies. Last
but not least, the high speed data memory, which is needed for
high-speed data acquisition, is available only on few modules
(which are thus more expensive).
IV. HECTOR HARDWARE TOOLS
The main motivation for designing the HECTOR evaluation
platform was to design hardware, which would be optimized
for a thorough, but still easy evaluation of cryptographic prim-
itives implemented in FPGA and ASIC devices. The designed
modular platform consists of a motherboard and four types
of interchangeable daughter boards. Evaluated cryptographic
primitives are implemented in daughter boards with hardware
resources significantly reduced and data are stored, processed
and transmitted to the PC using the motherboard featuring
large choice of peripherals and interfaces. The daughter boards
can be connected to the motherboard remotely and can be thus
placed in a hostile environment during attacks.
A. Daughter Board
The HECTOR daughter boards are designed to allow evalu-
ation of primitives across different FPGA families and ASICs.
The selected architecture has two main advantages. First,
the daughter modules contain only the necessary hardware
components, which minimizes their impact on the behavior
of the target primitive. Second, the module is simple and thus
cheaper, i.e. a huge number of modules can be manufactured
to test PUFs.
Three types of daughter modules featuring Altera Cyclone
V, Xilinx Spartan-6, and Microsemi SmartFusion 2 FPGA
were designed. The fourth type of the daughter module will
feature an ASIC, which will be designed in the framework of
the project.
Selected devices represent recent FPGA families of main
FPGA vendors. The daughter modules contain small program-
ming connector and an additional connector with input/output
pins, quartz oscillator, micro-miniature coaxial (MMCX) con-
nectors available for side-channel attacks (SCA) implementa-
tion (triggering and measurement), and a SATA connector. The
Fig. 1: Spartan-6 HECTOR daughter board layout
SATA connector is used to power the board and to transfer
data between the daughter board and the motherboard (see
Fig. 1). The SATA connector is used mainly for its good
signal integrity and mechanical features. The SATA interface
protocol is not supported by the hardware. Instead, four LVDS
(low voltage differential signaling) signal couples, three single
ended wires and power supply voltages are present on the
connector. The daughter boards contain high quality power
filters. To reduce the cost and the electric noise, all power
regulators are placed on the motherboard.
B. Motherboard
The main task of the motherboard is to control daughter
modules, to read and eventually to process data from the
modules and to ensure data transfers to the PC. The board
uses USB interface to communicate with the PC and a variety
of connectors for plugging in different daughter modules. (see
Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2: Motherboard hardware block diagram
The motherboard is based on the Microsemi SmartFusion
2 M2S025 FPGA. The SmartFusion 2 (SF2) is a system on
chip (SoC) FPGA device, which integrates a flash-based FPGA
fabric and a 166 MHz ARM Cortex-M3 processor. The time-
critical parts of the system can be processed by the fabric and
the communication protocol can be implemented in the Micro-
controller Sub-System (MSS). The SF2 can be programmed
through the JTAG interface by FlashPro programmer (both
FPGA and MCU). The programming interface can be also
used for debugging the firmware using SoftConsole or other
tools like IAR or KEIL.
The SmartFusion 2 M2S025 device features:
• 27696 logic elements (4 LUT + DFF),
• 34 math blocks, 6 PLLs, MSS running at 166 MHz,
• MSS 256 kB eNVM and 64 kB eSRAM,
• 267 total user I/Os.
The HECTOR motherboard features synchronous low-
power 512 Mb (64 MB) DDR SDRAM memory. It runs at
166 MHz, for a total theoretical bandwidth over 5.3 Gbps. It
is provided as a flexible volatile memory for user applications.
The communication between the SF2 and the PC is ensured
via USB by two data channels. The first one, the virtual COM
port, is designed to exchange control packets between the
motherboard and the PC using a simple UART protocol. The
communication is controlled by the FTDI device FT232RL.
The UART protocol is supported by many operating systems,
therefore no special driver is necessary.
The second channel is designed to provide reliable high-
speed data transfers using the USB mass storage class inter-
face, which is natively supported by operation systems, too.
It is ensured by the USB physical layer circuit (USB3300),
which creates an intermediate interface between the SF2 and
the USB differential wires.
Both USB ports are connected to the USB HUB (USB2640),
which ensures reliable data transfers to the PC. An additional
Micro SD card reader with a mass storage class interface is
connected to the USB HUB, too. The SC card can contain for
example some installation software.
Two additional micro SD card slots placed on the mother-
board can be used to save and to transfer data to other devices.
The motherboard is powered by an external 5 V power
supply. Only linear regulators are used on the board due to
their low noise compared to noisy switching regulators. This
low noise feature is very important for fair TRNG and PUF
evaluation, but also for evaluation of robustness against side
channel attacks.
In order to reduce the cost of daughter boards, the boards are
powered from dedicated voltage regulators, which are placed
on the motherboard. Three of them are user-configurable by
micro switches. The configurable regulators were used to
ensure compatibility across various daughter boards, which
usually require different power supplies (e.g. the power voltage
of the FPGA core may be different). The whole set of power
supplies is properly filtered to avoid any interference or noise.
The motherboard provides three connectors for connecting
additional board (HECTOR daughter boards or Evariste II
modules):
• High-definition multimedia interface (HDMI) connector,
• Serial - ATA (SATA) connector,
• Zero insertion force (ZIF) connector.
The daughter boards can be plugged directly into the
motherboard using the SATA connector or remotely using an
HDMI cable.
The SATA connector ensures easy, reliable, low cost and low
noise connection. An optional aluminium lid can be used to
protect the daughter board from surrounding electro-magnetic
fields, if necessary.
Connection of the daughter board via the HDMI cable
can be useful when the tested device should be placed in a
temperature controlled chamber or a Faraday cage. To make
Fig. 3: Layout of the HECTOR motherboard featuring the SmartFusion 2 FPGA device
the connection easier, the same data signals are present on both
SATA and HDMI connectors. However, in the case of a remote
use of daughter boards, the power must be provided from an
external power source connected to the available HDMI-to-
SATA adapter module.
The zero insertion force (ZIF) connector, which is available
on the motherboard is dedicated to additional boards, such as:
• Evariste II modules [9],
• Expansion boards (e.g. with switches and LEDs).
V. CONFIGURATION OF THE SYSTEM AND REFERENCE
DESIGNS
A set of tools is provided in several reference designs: the
user applications running on the PC, and the motherboard
hardware and firmware adapted to various user applications
placed in daughter boards. The main components of the system
are depicted in Fig. 4.
Four reference designs are currently available:
• Simple control of the daughter board inputs and outputs,
• Simple data processing module placed in the daughter
board and accessed from the PC via motherboard,
• High-speed data acquisition from a daughter board,
• Simple TRNG.
The proposed software tools and configuration of the system
vary depending on the application. For the sake of place,
we will briefly present only the fourth reference design in
SectionVI-C.
VI. SOFTWARE TOOLS
Two groups of software tools are available: the PC applica-
tion software and the motherboard firmware.
A. PC Application Software
The main task of the PC application software is to provide
the user API to the motherboard via USB interface. It uses a
virtual COM port (VCP) to transfer commands and the state
word and a USB mass storage interface to transfer data. The
proposed communication protocol ensures reliable control of
the motherboard by exchanging command and state packets.
Created data files can be accessed directly from the PC.
To ensure flexibility and system independence, the software
running on the PC is developed in a TCL language. Only a
TCL interpreter is needed to read user scripts. The TCL in-
terpreter is usually installed during the FPGA design software
installation (e.g. Quartus or Libero). The script can be very
easily edited and adapted to user requirements.
B. Motherboard Firmware
The motherboard firmware runs on the microcontroller
subsystem (MSS) inside the FPGA device and it reads/writes
to internal MSS peripherals, user peripherals placed in the
FPGA fabric and external memory place on the motherboard.
The firmware is written in the C programming language.
The MSS part has the following roles:
• Reception of commands from the PC,
• Control of the device under test by sending commands
to the FPGA fabric,
• Maintenance of the file system for data transfers (files
can have up to 32 MB).
As mentioned earlier, the motherboard uses two communi-
cation channels: the UART for commands, status and small
data (32-bit data blocks); and the USB mass-storage device to
transfer large files (up to 30 MB in size).
The main role of the Packetizer-Depacketizer (PD) block is
to maintain a communication protocol based on transferring
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Fig. 4: Internal system block diagram
small 12-byte packets via UART. In this communication, the
PC is a master device, which initializes every communication.
The communication is based on the command-response pairs
where each command generates a response. There are few
types of commands – each having its own header and pre-
defined contents (see Fig. 5). PD recognizes a header of
the packet, collects appropriate data and generates response
packets.
13 C0 00 00 .____________. ww xx yy zz
4B 4B 4B
reserved
MSS instruction
GPIO conﬁg
Not used
Not used
 
Zero padding
Preﬁx
Head
Fig. 5: Example of the command packet
The USB mass storage class disk drive is based on the
reference design delivered by Microsemi. The disk is located
in the RAM of the motherboard. The memory space is divided
to two halves. The first half is used for the file system and the
second half is used as a cache reserved for data acquisitions.
The file system is based on the open-source library called
FatFs. It is a generic FAT/exFAT file system module aimed at
small embedded systems implementations.
A Communication Control block contains predefined func-
tions, which manage operations in the FPGA and response to
received packets. This block provides a simple way of how to
insert new instructions. Predefined functions (instructions) are
called by packets in following steps:
• Wait for the new instruction (idle state),
• Get new instruction from the PD,
• Execute instruction and send response to the PD.
The MSS features many channels to communicate with
FPGA. There are 8+2 GPIOs which can be directly connected
to the output of the device or can be used as a reset or common
signals for the FPGA fabric instances.
An AHB lite bus is used to transfer small data and com-
mands between the MSS and FPGA fabric parts. The control
block is based on the AHB lite protocol specification. It
enables MSS to write or read to/from FPGA registers without
the need of any special routines.
The RAM interface implemented in FPGA can write up to
32 MB data blocks to the external RAM on the bit rate up to
400 Mbps. It uses the AHB bus to directly write data to the
external RAM (DMA access).
The command execution state machine is implemented in
the FPGA fabric. It is a simple state machine, which executes
received commands. The command is transferred to the 32-bit
command register block situated in the FPGA fabric.
C. TRNG Reference Design
We use a Simple TRNG reference desing with a PLL TRNG
[4] implemented in the daughter board (see Fig. 6) as an
example. The application requires fast acquisition system with
big storage capacity. Generated data need to be stored in an
external RAM to be sent to the host PC via USB.
The TRNG implemented in the daughter board uses just
one data signal and one strobe signal. The output of the TRNG
(before or after the decimator) can be selected using the GPIO.
The reset signal is also connected. The daughter board can
be connected to the SATA or HDMI slot. The connector is
selected from the TCL script using a multiplexer placed in the
FPGA fabric.
The serial output of the generator is converted to 32-bit
words in a S/P converter. This converter also solves the
synchronization problem between two independent domains
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Fig. 6: Example of TRNG acquisition system implementation
(the TRNG clock domain and the acquisition system clock
domain).
The control block just samples the output of the converter
and saves it to the external RAM. At the end of the data
acquisition, data are copied from the acquisition half of the
memory to the file system in the second half of the memory.
The acquisition system is controlled by the host PC execut-
ing the following steps:
1) Send the Control packet to create the file system,
2) Send the Fabric packet to choose the connector
(SATA/HDMI),
3) Send the Read file packet to run operation and set the
size and the name of the required file,
4) Repeatedly send the Control packet to get the state of
the operation,
5) Send the Control packet to mount the HECTOR disk,
6) Copy the file from the mass storage device
(HECTOR disk).
VII. CONCLUSION
The HECTOR evaluation platform was designed following
the project requirements and it reflects the needs of all
HECTOR partners. It is is a unique and powerful tool set
particularly suitable for testing and evaluation of cryptographic
primitives. However, the platform is sufficiently flexible to be
adapted to a variety of other applications.
Comparing to existing platforms aimed at evaluation of
cryptographic primitives and side-channel attacks, the HEC-
TOR evaluation platform is unique in the following crucial
points:
• Because of the simplicity of the daughter modules, a huge
number of boards can be manufactured and tested. This
is particularly useful for PUF evaluation.
• The number of components on the daughter board is
limited to a strict minimum to minimize undesirable
effects on the target of evaluation.
• Thanks to the simple serial interface existing between the
motherboard and daughter boards, the target device can
be placed remotely in a hostile environment, in order to
perform active attacks,
All the IP functions and software tools from the reference
designs are open-source. According to the HECTOR consor-
tium agreement, the HECTOR evaluation boards can be used
by third parties for an educational dissemination purposes.
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